Principle
Areas of Research: Philosophy of psychology;
Philosophy of cognitive science; Philosophy of mind;
Empirical moral psychology; Metaphysics
Brief Biography: I
grew up in one of the suburbs of Salt Lake City, Utah. My
mother worked as a piecemeal seamstress, my father worked
driving locomotive and painting military camouflage (yes,
that's two 40hr weeks, plus overtime). I read a lot of
books, tossed a lot of boxes out of trailers, and even spent
a bit of time building railroad. After college, I bounced
around the US for a number of years; and then, in the spring
of 2008, I completed my Ph.D in the department of philosophy
at UNC - Chapel Hill. I spent two years working as a
visiting researcher and postdoctoral fellow in the Cognitive
Evolution Laboratory at Harvard University; I
also spent a concurrent year as a postdoctoral Research
Associate in the Center for
Cognitive Studies at Tufts University (working with
one of my greatest philosophical influences, Dan
Dennett). In the fall of 2009, I began working as an
Assistant Professor in the Department of
Philosophy at Georgetown University.
My research is highly interdisciplinary (perhaps to the
extreme) and I tend to publish my research in both
philosophical and psychological venues. Methodologically, I
hold that in answering philosophical questions, it is
necessary to employ a variety of tools and techniques that
cross-cut philosophical, scientific, and commonsense domains
of discourse. This has led me to develop three interrelated
research projects:
- The bulk of my current research is dedicated to
developing a more complete understanding of the ways in
which cognitive mechanisms must be coordinated and
integrated if something is to count as a genuinely
cognitive system. On the basis of this research, I
advocate the claim that there are some genuinely
collective mental states (see "Do you see what we see",
"Genuinely collective emotions", and "Minimal minds"). I
am have recently finished a draft of a book manuscript
in which I develop a more complete argument for the
claim that some groups, as such, have the capacity to be in
cognitive states in
precisely the same sense that individuals do
(If you are interested in seeing this manuscript, please
feel free to contact me).
- My research on the possibility of collective mental
states has also led me to investigate the ways in which
a distributed computational achictecture allows minds
like ours to solve complex representational tasks in an
ever changing world (see "Troubles with stereotypes for
our Spinozan psychologies" and "Banishing 'I' and 'we'
from accounts of metacognition"). I think that the
(ruthlessly naturalized) metaphysics of mind that I
develop in my work on collective mentality offers a
promising strrategy for developing a radically
anti-Cartesian account of individual mentality, and in
future research I intend to develop these implications.
- Finally, I am interested in the role of thought
experiments and intuitions in philosophy and cognitive
science. Specifically, I am interested in the ways in
which thought experiments can be used as part of a
scientific methodology as well as the ways in which
results of experiments in social psychology, cognitive
anthropology, and moral psychology can function as
evidence for philosophical positions. On the basis of
these interests, I have carried out a number of
survey-based experiments in which I have examined the
commonsense understanding of mental states (see
"Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciosuness" and
"What does the Nation of China think about phenomenal
states") and the patterns in commonsense moral
judgments. I have recently come to be more and more
skeptical of survey methods, and in future theoretical
papers I plan to address a set of methodological worries
about these methods.
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