Roger LagunoffProfessor of Economics
|
|
|
Research Fields: Game Theory, Microeconomic theory, Political economy, and Public economics. Education: Ph.D., Economics, University of Minnesota, 1989.
1. Working Papers: theworking paperslisted below are available in Acrobat .pdf format. I amalsohappy to send you hard copies of my working papers. Contact me. "Communication and Learning," with L. Anderlini and D. Gerardi, February, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," with J. Bai, Current draft: February, 2008. Original Draft: Summer, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," with L. Anderlini and D. Gerardi, Current draft: October, 2007. Original: January, 2007. Markov Equilibrium in Models ofDynamic Endogenous Political Institutions, Current: December 2006. Original: December, 2004. "MarkovPerfectEquilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games " with H. Haller, Original Draft: April, 1997. Current: October, 2006. "An ``Anti-Folk Theorem'' for aClass of AsynchronouslyRepeated Games" with A Matsui, September, 1995. (This Working Papercontains numerous results not contained in the published version,entitled"Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Games").
2. Recent and Forthcoming Publications: A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," with L. Anderlini and D. Gerardi, Economic Theory, forthcoming. "On the Size and Structure of GroupCooperation," with M. Haag, Journal of Economic Theory, 135: 68-89 (2007). "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," with W. Jack, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108: 703-25 (2006). "Dynamic Enfranchisement," with W. Jack, Journal of Public Economics, 90, 551-572 (2006). "Credible Communication in DynasticGovernment," Journal of Public Economics, 90, 59-86 (2006). "International versus Domestic Auditing ofBank Solvency,"with A. Feltenstein, Journal ofInternational Economics, 67: 73-96 (2005). "Communicationin Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and`Coverups'," with L. Anderlini, Economic Theory, 26: 265-99. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory,Communication,and Altruism ," with A. Matsui, Review of Economic Design, 8:383-411 (2004). "A Model of Financial Fragility," with S. Schreft, "Are `Anti-Folk Theorems' in Repeated Games Nongeneric?" withA. Matsui, "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," withH. Haller, "On the Evolution of Pareto Optimal Behavior in RepeatedCoordinationProblems,"
Courses Taught atGeorgetown: Econ681a: Political Economy Econ-001: Microeconomic Principles
| |
