REASON AND FAITH FOR SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
January 7, 1994

by Sule Elkatip (Istanbul)

(I) The problem

The question of faith and reason is thought in many cases to be a problem
of consistency among the dictates of reason and those of faith and is
formulated in terms of the reliability of the many ways of justifying true
belief. Thus the qualm `Which is more reliable?' may change into a doubt
and eventually it is asked whether faith justifies knowledge: 

Another type of claim to knowledge ... is faith.
The same difficulty that plagued the claims to
knowledge by intuition and revelation occurs
here ... Thus sense experience and reasoning, not
faith, are the basis for the claim of reliability
... Indeed, it seems too obvious to mention that
when people appeal solely to faith as a way of
knowing, they do so because there is no
evidence that what they say is true ... 1

The above explanation taken from the finale of a section discussing the
sources of knowledge in a somehow outdated textbook of philosophical
analysis written in our century is not in essence very far removed from
the debates which had taken place among medieval philosophers after the
twelve hundreds. The former may be more straigtforward in rejecting faith
as knowledge. But the latter too must have comprised strong arguments
against the reliability of faith. Scotus formulates several of these
arguments, which reject the reliability of faith after a cursory
examination, in the first question of the Prologus to the Ordinatio.2 In
the course of ScotusÙ evaluation of the controversy for and against the
reliability of faith not only do we discover the familiar qualms about
faith in comparison to sense-experience and the employment of reason, but
also we learn about the two distinct manners in which Thomas Aquinas and
John Duns Scotus were teaching in favor of faith. 

The first question of Scotus' prologue to the Ordinatio develops the issue
of faith from various perspectives. There are two questions which concern
us. The first question is about the reliability of faith in the eyes of
Scotus and Thomas. The other question is about the difference, if any,
between their thoughts on faith and reason. As to the first question, it
is quite clear that both doctors proclaim the reliability of faith. As to
the second question, the answer is that there are differences between the
two teachings. 

Scotus states that there can not be conclusive arguments in philosophy pro
the reliability of faith; all that can be done is to use persuasive
arguments from faith and at the same time to keep making the effort of
showing with strictly philosophical reasoning that the arguments of the
philosophers for the reliability of the intellect, the senses or some
other source is not as foolproof as one would like to have them. (n. 12,
nn. 66-71). 

Aquinas on the one hand holds that faith is reliable, but on the other
hand he maintains an Aristotelian theory of knowledge. All knowledge is
derived from the senses. The human intellect can not operate without
phantasms or sensory data. And yet, the human intellect is not dependent
on a corporeal organ for its proper operations and the human soul is
incorruptible. There is one human soul for each human person and that soul
is the form or act of the human body. It is the business of the intellect
to know natures and essences in their common or absoluteley considered
natures. But still, a knowledge both of itself and of particular things is
possible for the human intellect. The final cause for mankind is salvation
and felicity in beholding God. It will be presented below that Aquinas
leaves an allowance for philosophers who interpret Aristotelian philosophy
as a philosophy devoid of sympathy for faith. He suggests that the end of
man may also be known solely in philosophy without recourse to faith. 

(II) The views of the two doctors

In the critical edition of the Ordinatio St. Thomas is cited by the
editors in the footnotes to the text. In the controversy between the
philosophers and the theologians, philosophers put forward three important
arguments. Philosophers uphold the perfection of nature. Theologians
recognize the necessity of divine grace and perfection. The Saint is
mentioned in relation to the second argument of the philosophers in
connection with Aristotle who divides the speculative sciences into
mathematics, physics and metaphysics. It seems that Aristotle proves the
impossibility of there being more speculative sciences because - in those
three, both as it is in itself and in asmuch as it is in every part, the
whole of being is thoroughly taken into account; by a similar argument
there can not be more practical sciences than those acquired by mankind.
(n. 8) St. Thomas is also mentioned in relation to a certain argument,
again from the side of the philosophers, against the need for faith. The
argument again takes off from Aristotle: `Nature never leaves out what is
necessary'; if it is not deficient in imperfect faculties, i.e., the
senses, much less will it be deficient in the intellect. (n. 2) In other
words, if supernatural aid is not needed by the senses for apprehending
their objects, neither will it be needed for the intellect which is a more
perfect faculty. 

However, St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledges the necessity and hence the
reliability of sacred doctrine in his Summa Theologica. `Whether, besides
the philosophical disciplines, any further doctrine is required?' he asks,
and his reply is in the affirmative: `It was necessary for man's salvation
that there should be a doctrine revealed by God, besides the philosophical
disciplines investigated by human reason ... because man is directed to
God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason'.3 Consequently,
it becomes to a certain extent difficult to locate the similarities and
differences between Aquinas and Scotus. They both seem to be inclined
alike for the necessity and therefore the reliability of faith as
knowledge. 

The prologue of the Ordinatio determines two positions: in
the beginning that of St. Thomas and later the position of St.
Augustine. But with neither of them does Scotus agree totally.
Although he must have had St. Thomas in mind at least with
respect to some philosophers and theologians, he must be credited
with fairness to Aquinas. It is with an allusion to the works of St.
Thomas that Scotus' triple argument in defense of the necessity
and therefore reliability of faith sets out: distinct knowledge of
his end through cognition is necessary for every agent. (n. 13)
Furthermore, in his replies to the arguments of the philosophers
Scotus makes an explicit reference to St. Thomas by citing him by
name; moreover, he quotes from the aforementioned very first
article of the Summa. (n. 79)

With three principal considerations Scotus sets forth the view that divine
revelation is necessary and that scientific knowledge derived just through
sense-experience and reason is not sufficient. A human being is a rational
agent and as such requires a Adistinct knowledge of his end. (nn. 13-15)
Even if reason suffices to prove that beholding God is the end of man, it
could not conclude that such a vision and enjoyment perpetually becomes
and agrees with a human being perfect both in body and in soul. Scotus is
of the opinion that the perpetuity of a good of this kind is the very
condition that makes this end desirable. (n. 16) On a declaration of the
immortality of the human soul - `The intellective soul is incorruptible' -
Scotus reasons that it can not be proved: 

It can be stated that although there are
probable reasons for this second proposition,
these are not demonstrative, nor for that
matter are they ever necessary reasons.4

Starting from a framework in which natural agents desire the end on
account of which they operate, the first persuasive argument considers
this to be necessary also for a knowing agent. Scotus points out that
human beings can not know their end distinctly from natural sources. He
utilizes passages of Nicomachean Ethics to demonstrate that even the
Philosopher himself was not very clear on this topic. (n. 14) We can show
something from the behavior manifest to us of a substance and that
something would just be - that such an end may agree with such a nature.
The proper end of no substance is cognized by us. We do not experience or
cognize any acts to belong to us in this life so that through them we may
naturally know some special end to agree with our nature. (n. 15)

Scotus' second persuasive argument is as follows: `It is necessary for
every conscious agent in pursuit of an end to know by what means and in
what way such an end may be attained; and also the knowledge of all things
which are necessary to that end is necessary; and thirdly the knowledge
that all that suffices for such an end is necessary'. (n. 17) And in his
third and last persuasive argument Scotus enjoins that if the enjoyment of
God is in itself manÙs end, God acts contingently and we can not ascertain
with the certainty of necessity that God does or does not accept merits as
worthy of such a reward. (n. 18)

(III) Conclusion

One student of Scotus has explained the situation with respect to Scotus
and Aquinas in the following way: we do not know our nature in that aspect
which would enable us to deduce its spiritual destiny from the nature.
Though by the light of nature we may know that man is a spiritual being or
even accept St. Thomas' proof that he needs grace, yet we can not infer
from man's nature the promises of the Gospel (Duns might say rather, `the
contingent will of God'), and therefore, since the Gospel is the mending
or fulfilment of Creation, we can not from our knowledge of man's nature
infer that final end which depends upon the Gospel.5

It is evident from the prologue that the conclusion above about St. 
Thomas and Duns Scotus follows from their respective thoughts on faith. 

Scotus quotes from St. Augustine to back up the criticism of his own
standpoint that although man can naturally know of his natural end, indeed
he can not know about his supernatural end: `the possibility of having
faith like the possibility of having charity belongs to human nature, but
the actual possession of faith like the actual possession of charity
pertains to the grace vouchsafed to the faithful'.6 Scotus concedes to St.
Augustine that God is the natural end of human beings. The part he will
not allow is that God naturally may be attained: the possibility of having
charity as it is a disposition with respect to God in Himself under the
proper notion of loving agrees with human nature according to a special
notion, which is not common to it and to sensibles; and hence, that
potentiality of human beings is not naturally recognizable in this life,
just as man is not known under the notion by which his potentiality is his
own. (n. 32)

Scotus' explicit quotation from the Summa of Aquinas clarifies the
difference between their teachings. Aquinas says that `there is no reason
why those things which are treated by the philosophical disciplines, so
far as they can be known by the light of natural reason, may not also be
treated by another science so far as they are known by the light of the
divine revelation'.7 He thus in this manner implies that sacred doctrine
by way of the divine revelation is not absolutely necessary. In fact St.
Thomas Aquinas says in the same article of the Summa the following: `in
order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more
surely, it was necessary that they be taught divine truths by divine
revelation'.8 It is a question of more or less fitness and certainty and
hence the logical consequence is that sacred doctrine may not be as good
and reliable as reason based on sense-experience; the reliability of faith
as a justification of true belief may be doubted. 

NOTES

1John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis , 2nd ed. (1967;
rpt. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1970) p. 140. 

2John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio Prologus, Opera Omnia I (Civitas Vaticana:
Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950). 

3Summa Theologica , p. I ch. 1 q. 1.

4Allan Wolter, O.F.M., trans., Philosophical Writings: A Selection, The
Nelson Philosophical Texts, ed. Raymond Klibansky, The Library of Liberal
Arts (1962; rpt. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1978)
pp. 146-147. 

5Nathaniel Micklem, Reason and Revelation: a question from Duns Scotus
(Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1953) p. 18. 

6Ibid. , p. 17; n. 22.

7Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (2 vols., New
York: Random House, 1945) p. 6; p. I ch. 1 q. 1. 

8Ibid.